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Abstract: The concept of ‘transition’ has been widely used an analytical frame for 
understanding the continuing turbulence of the Italian political system since the fall of the 
First Republic. Critics argue that, after nearly two decades of ‘transition’ and with no 
endpoint in sight, the model has lost its explanatory force. In this paper I argue that the 
‘transition’ perspective represents a political reality - a coherent set of expectations and 
pressures, widely acknowledged by Italian political actors - and one which the Italian Left, 
in particular, cannot afford to ignore. In terms of timescale, I argue for the continuing 
relevance of the ‘democratic consolidation’ model and suggest that the Italian Republic has 
been ‘in transition’ since 1948.  
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Since 1992, when the first signs of the Tangentopoli corruption scandal 
came to light, the fortunes of the Left – and in particular the Partito 
Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, PCI) and its successors, 
including the present-day Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD) – 
have been intimately connected to the perception of the Italian political 
system as ‘in transition’.  
In what follows, I discuss criticisms of the concept of the Italian 
‘transition’ and develop a model of the transition with some explanatory 
force, drawing on the history of the First Republic and the model of 
democratic consolidation developed by Geoffrey Pridham (1990). The 
Italian transition, I argue, is shorthand for a politics in which conventional 
left/right antagonisms are subordinated to three themes: the establishment 
of alternation in government; an end to the exclusion of the Left, and of 
‘anti-system’ parties more generally, and the assertion of the primacy of 
democratic politics over special interests and systems of corrupt exchange. I 
then examine the difficult and contradictory demands which this politics 
has placed on parties of the Left. I focus on the ‘alternation’ criterion and 
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consider the PD as an attempted solution to a longstanding problem in 
electoral arithmetic, reviewing the history of the centre left in the First 
Republic and in the subsequent period of transition. Finally, I review 
Walter Veltroni’s leadership of the PD, characterised by a strategic focus on 
building a party capable of alternation, and its results; I conclude by 
suggesting that the PD will inevitably return to a full engagement with the 
transition agenda. 
 
 
Transition? What transition? 
The concept of an Italian transition has come under sustained criticism. It is 
undeniable, to take the most obvious objection, that the concept of 
‘transition’ implies a relatively brief interval between two settled states: ‘if 
“transition” implies that a polity is in between one regime and another, 
then the idea that this is true of Italy has been increasingly hard to sustain 
as time has gone on, simply because of the unequivocal failure of all 
attempts to complete it’ (Bull and Newell, 2009: 42). The nineteen-year 
duration of the supposed Italian transition equates to almost half of the 
First Republic’s 44-year life. On these grounds alone, it can be argued that 
these turbulent years should not be regarded as a transitional period before 
the establishment of a Second Republic, but as the Second Republic itself. 
It could reasonably be objected that this argument is excessively 
normative: a typical transition period may only last a year or two, but 
anomalous political situations can produce anomalous and extended 
transition periods. Moreover, if we assume a short transitional period but 
believe that the current period continues to be characterised by anomalous 
and disordered political processes, this prompts the question of how we 
should characterise a period with more orderly and ‘normal’ politics, when 
and if such a period becomes established. Looking forward to a Third 
Republic – or even maintaining that the Second has come and gone, and the 
Third already exists (Calise, 2009: 151) – seems unsatisfactory, if only on the 
grounds of parsimony. 
A more fundamental objection is that any transition has a destination 
as well as a source; in other words, the ‘transition’ framing implies a known 
endpoint. This in turn suggests that the supposed endpoint may never be 
achieved: political actors are under no obligation to fulfil the expectations 
of political scientists. As a result, the impression of a period of transition 
may be prolonged indefinitely, producing a misleading impression of 
continuing disorder and obscuring the establishment of significant stable 
reference points and agreements on practice and principle. 
This argument does not discount the period of turbulence initiated by 
Tangentopoli, but suggests that a renewed political order may already have 
been pieced together out of the wreckage of the First Republic. While this 
order may not match up to the future Second Republic imagined by 
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theorists of the Italian transition, this is a secondary point; the relevant 
questions concern whether it has established itself, enjoys popular assent 
and has the capacity to reproduce itself. If the new political order meets 
these criteria, we can reasonably assume that any transitional period is over 
– and, perhaps, has been for some time. Viewed in this light, shorn of the 
implicit teleology of the Second Republic model, the transitional period 
itself may take on very different characteristics. Thus Briquet argues: ‘the 
historical cycle which Italy underwent in the last decade of the twentieth 
century consisted above all of a brutal process of replacement of political 
elites, far more than it was the product of an abortive attempt to restore 
transparency and morality at the heart of politics’ (Briquet, 2007: 335) 
I have taken issue with Briquet’s reading of Tangentopoli and its 
aftermath elsewhere (Edwards, 2008). Here I want to set the concept of a 
continuing Italian transition in a broader context. Pridham’s (1990) work on 
‘democratic consolidation’ remains relevant here. Pridham suggested that 
the process of transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy is 
followed by an analytically distinct stage of ‘consolidation’, whose 
completion is characterised by two ‘negative’ and two ‘positive’ 
achievements. On the negative side, we should look for ‘a peaceful or 
basically uncontested transfer of power between parties in government and 
opposition, with the implication that serious “anti-system” tendencies have 
disappeared’, and for ‘potential challenges or threats to the new system 
from non-political actors [to] diminish and eventually fade’.1 In positive 
terms, consolidation is secure when ‘government performance is no longer 
systemically crucial and merely reflects on the standing of the party or 
parties in power’, and when ‘there is evidence that the political culture is 
being “remade” in a system-supportive direction’ (Pridham, 1990: 108). 
A peaceful transfer of power from government to opposition, with no 
serious ‘anti-system’ tendencies involved; few or no challenges from forces 
alien to democracy; an end to the perception that government performance 
reflects on the system as a whole; evolution of political culture in a ‘system-
supportive’ direction: what is immediately obvious in the Italian context is 
how poorly these criteria were met by the First Republic. At no time in its 
history did power pass from government to opposition. This, of course, 
relates directly to the second part of Pridham’s formulation. Any transfer of 
power away from the ruling Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats, 
DC) must needs give power to the PCI, whose electoral appeal and 
ideological breadth was second only to the DC’s own; the PCI, however, 
was perceived (or labelled) as an ‘anti-system’ party: a left-wing 
counterpart to the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social 
Movement, MSI). 
The concept of the ‘anti-system’ party was always problematic, 
bundling together ideological, relational and purely ascriptive criteria 
(Capoccia, 2002). The model of ‘opposed extremisms’, each an equal threat 
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to Italian democracy, was particularly hard to justify on ideological 
grounds, given the consistent moderation of the PCI and the party’s 
impeccable anti-fascist credentials. Viewed in purely relational terms, 
however, the ‘anti-system’ framing was highly functional, justifying – 
indeed, making imperative – the DC’s continuous occupation of the centre 
(in both senses of the term) from 1948 to 1994. It should also be noted that 
the PCI only partially challenged the assumptions under which it was 
excluded, operating its own conventio ad excludendum of the Left: in line 
with its self-presentation as a moderate and constitutional party, the PCI 
operated as ‘gatekeeper’ to the extreme Left, admitting some groups and 
ideologies to the party’s orbit but denouncing others with as much fervour 
as the Christian Democrats themselves (Edwards, 2009). 
Pridham’s second criterion, the absence of systemic challenges from 
actors based outside the democratic system, was not met until fairly late in 
the First Republic’s life: the last serious coup attempt took place in 1970, 
while Italian political exchanges continued to be played out in the shadow 
of reserve armies and secret arms dumps for some time afterwards. 
External threats defined more broadly – to include threats from forces with 
a non- or pre-democratic power base to the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the political system, as well as its existence – overshadowed the First 
Republic throughout its history, and ultimately destroyed it: this was a 
system in which democratic politics took second place, with first place 
variously taken by clandestine networks, organised crime and mere local 
rent-seekers (Allum and Allum, 2008: 349). Addressing Pridham’s third 
criterion, the system was also overshadowed by the recurring suspicion 
that government crises and failures betrayed more fundamental problems: 
a suspicion which the explosion of Tangentopoli showed to be well 
founded. The political cultures of the First Republic, lastly, were not so 
much system-supportive as system-avoidant. Political commentary 
assumed a certain level of literacy in the specialised language of politichese 
(Croci, 2001), but also drew on bodies of ideas which would seldom find 
expression in parliamentary debate: distinct liberal, Catholic and 
Communist cultures coexisted, typically oriented to the press, publishing 
and the universities rather than to government. The continuing appeal of 
the governments of the First Republic rested far more on sub-cultural and 
material ties – the voto di appartenenza (‘vote of belonging’) and voto di 
scambio (‘exchange vote’) – than on consonance with broader political 
cultures. 
Reworking Pridham’s criteria slightly in the light of the Italian post-
war experience, we can say that an enduringly consolidated democratic 
system will have something like the following features: 
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Primacy of democratic politics: no challenges to the legitimacy or 
functioning of the democratic system from forces with a non-democratic 
power base 
Alternation: consecutive peaceful and uncontested transfers of power 
between government and opposition, in both directions 
Inclusion: no parties with a significant electoral base regarded as ‘anti-
system’ and excluded from all possible governmental alliances 
 
Two remaining criteria are perhaps indicators of successful consolidation 
rather preconditions for consolidation to be achieved, and can be phrased 
as follows: 
 
System resilience: policy failures understood and acted on as such, not 
as indicators of the need for systemic reform 
Democratic political culture: debate within the political sphere and 
within civil society conducted in terms which tend to entrench the above 
principles 
 
Newell suggests that ‘the apparent absence of any political actor or group 
of actors sufficiently powerful to impose a solution that would end the 
transition in effect meant that the [endpoint] did not exist, or at least could 
not be identified’, going on to suggest that ‘Italian political debate has, at 
least since the 1980s, been characterised, on the one hand, by a general 
consensus that fundamental institutional reform is needed, and, on the 
other, by a lack of agreement over what needs to be changed’ (Newell, 
2009: 5 emphasis in original). I would suggest, rather, that the criteria for 
democratic consolidation effectively supply the missing definition of the 
endpoint of the period of transition, as well as suggesting a framework 
within which the politics of the period of transition can be understood. 
Tangentopoli fuelled and amplified a debate which had already begun (or 
recommenced) during the 1980s, making shamefully public the defects of 
the First Republic. This was a republic in which democratic politics was 
permanently overshadowed by networks of more or less corrupt exchange. 
It was a system which had never known alternation, and which had 
systematically excluded its second party from national government. And, 
crucially, it was a system in which the many failings of the governing party 
were seen as symptoms of a malaise extending far beyond particular policy 
choices, resolvable only through systemic reform. 
The crisis initiated in 1992 swept away entrenched obstacles to the 
process of democratic consolidation and raised awareness of the need to 
pursue the process with greater consistency: the Italian transition began 
with the awareness that the First Republic could not continue and the 
aspiration to build something better. When the First Republic’s democratic 
institutions and processes were described as ‘blocked’, what was being 
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blocked was the full consolidation of the democratic system imposed on 
Italy in 1948. Far from regarding the period since 1992 as too long to be 
called transitional, we can see the First Republic itself as a 44-year period of 
transition, albeit one which halted far short of its endpoint. The upheaval of 
1992 was seized on not only by Briquet’s aspirant caste of junior politicians 
but by political groups with a genuine enthusiasm for resuming the process 
of democratic consolidation – as well as, in most cases, a partisan interest in 
the anticipated outcome. It is this project of renewed democratic 
consolidation, begun in the unprecedentedly fluid conditions of 1992-3, 
which is now associated with the concept of ‘transition’. 
 
 
The Left in midstream, 1992- 
Despite the length of time which it has already continued and the 
possibility that its implicit endpoint will never be reached, the Italian 
transition is a reality. More precisely, it is a political reality: a set of goals 
which are widely considered to form a coherent agenda, together with a 
diffuse sense that this agenda needs to be pursued if Italy is ever to emerge 
from the transition into normality. 
The fortunes of the Left since 1992 have been inextricably linked to the 
project of the Italian transition, on three levels – each of which has caused 
problems for the Left’s post-Communist majority component. Firstly, the 
identity of ‘reformist’ has carried with it a commitment to the three goals 
identified above: alternation in government; an end to the exclusion of the 
Left; the reassertion of the primacy of politics over corporate interests or 
corrupt exchanges. Which is to say, not that any party situating itself in the 
‘reformist’ camp must embrace all of these goals, but that any such party 
must be willing to ally itself with other parties whose goals these are. The 
result has been, not merely the creation of ‘conditions of imperfect bipolarism 
[superimposed on] a multi-polar reality’ (Edwards, 2005: 229 emphasis in 
original), but the elevation of the goals of the ‘transition’ into an overriding 
(albeit imperfect) bipolarity. Since 1992 the primary cleavage in Italian 
politics has been between those parties which support any of the goals of 
the transition and those which oppose all of them. The democratic Left has 
had no choice but to join the ‘pro-transition’ forces, and to devote at least 
some of its efforts to acting as the centre of a ‘pro-transition’ alliance; the 
emblem of this imperative is the seemingly unshakeable alliance between 
the PCI’s successors and Antonio Di Pietro, an authoritarian conservative 
leading a personal party. 
The second sense in which the identity of the Left is bound up with the 
transition project follows from the first. The parties of the Left have 
consistently been committed (sometimes reluctantly) to creating the 
conditions in which all three of the goals of the transition could be met: not 
only alternation in power but also an end to corruption and an end to the 
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exclusion of the Left. In other words, the goals of the transition have not 
only influenced the Left’s strategic priorities and its choice of coalition 
partners within the electoral party system, but its choice of governmental 
coalition partners and its policy programmes within the parliamentary 
party system. 
Bardi (2007) suggests that a centrifugal logic of mutual differentiation 
and inter-party competition continues to apply within the parliamentary 
party system, even while the bipolarism of the electoral party system 
mandates centripetal competition within and to a lesser extent between the 
two main blocs. The implication of this model, applied to the complex and 
imperfect bipolarism produced by the three distinct goals of ‘transition’, is 
that a broad Left whose component parts are committed to different 
elements of the transition project will always be at a disadvantage with 
respect to a Right which is united in rejecting them all: the logic of party 
self-interest will always encourage one party to denounce its allies’ 
backsliding from its particular commitments, another to dissociate itself 
from its allies’ excessive zeal. 
These concerns are far from hypothetical: witness Romano Prodi’s 
decision in May 2006 to entrust the Ministry of Justice to Clemente 
Mastella, a past (and future) ally of Silvio Berlusconi who had never shown 
much enthusiasm for any of the three touchstone policies, and who has 
since been involved in corruption investigations. Di Pietro, whom an 
outside observer might have considered a more appropriate candidate, was 
instead made Minister for Infrastructure and Transport. While this tactical 
allocation of portfolios minimised the opportunities for Di Pietro to 
outflank his own government, it did not ultimately prevent Mastella from 
bringing the Prodi government down, defecting from the majority so as to 
pre-empt a majoritarian electoral reform which would have promoted 
alternation at the cost of destroying his own party’s prospects. 
Thirdly and crucially, two of the three goals of transition relate directly 
to the Left itself. The Left parties which engaged in the project of bringing 
about the transition would also be transformed by it; changes to those 
parties would be among the conditions by which it could be known that the 
transition was complete. On the far side of the phase of transition, in other 
words, there would be a Left party capable of alternating in power with a 
party of the Right: a party substantial enough either to form a government 
on its own or to dominate a governing coalition, and aiming not to occupy 
the centre but to occupy the Left and draw support from the centre – and 
hence periodically alternate in power with the Right. Since the first version 
of the Ulivo (Olive-tree) coalition was established in the mid-1990s, it has 
been generally accepted that this party must be built on the successor party 
to the Right and centre of the PCI together with successors to the left of the 
DC: hence Prodi’s consistent commitment to a dual-track project, to build 
both the Unione, a broad alliance of all parties committed to the transition, 
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and the Ulivo, a core alliance based on successor parties to the DC (La 
Margherita, (‘the Daisy’)) and the PCI (1991-8: Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left, PDS); 1998-2007: Democratici di 
Sinistra (Left Democrats, DS)). 
There would also be a Left which was not excluded: after the 
transition, no significant Left parties would be labelled as ‘anti-system’. 
Much hangs on how this second criterion is interpreted. As noted above, 
the exclusion of the PCI from power in the First Republic did not prevent 
the party from operating its own exclusive policies towards the Left outside 
the party; indeed, dissociating the PCI from disorderly extreme-left 
elements was a key manoeuvre in making the party itself seem a suitable 
candidate for political power. The PCI, in other words, did not challenge 
the principle of excluding the Left on the grounds of its anti-system 
tendencies, but only the definition of who was to be excluded and by 
whom. The Left which succeeded in gaining entry to the outer reaches of 
the DC’s system of power, at the time of the Historic Compromise, was 
itself responsible for the exclusion of the far Left. 
It is true that a political system which can include every political 
tendency in existence is probably neither desirable nor feasible: apart from 
anything else, some parties proclaim their own ‘anti-system’ identity. 
(Following the 2008 election, the Trotskyist party, Sinistra Critica (‘the 
Critical Left’) laid down as one of its fundamental principles ‘refusal to 
become involved in governing the current society’ (Sinistra Critica, 2008)). 
What should be avoided – and would not be consistent with the goal of 
political inclusion – is the somewhat Kafkaesque logic of the First Republic, 
whereby the authoritative and damning label of ‘anti-system’ was, at least 
in part, an ascriptive status which could be assigned or withdrawn at will 
by a party’s opponents. 
 
 
The alternation that never was, 1948-2008 
While Walter Veltroni’s leadership of the PD was unusually unsuccessful, 
he was not the first reformist political leader to give high priority to the 
goal of producing a Left party capable of alternation. Table 1 shows the 
percentage vote share obtained at every national election between 1953 and 
1992 by seven categories of party: the DC; the DC’s actual or potential 
allies; the PCI / PDS; reformist parties; parties of the radical Left; parties of 
the ‘anti-system’ Right; and all other parties. The ‘reformist’ category 
includes the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party, PSI) in 1948 
and 1953; from 1976 on it includes the Radical Party, the Greens (1987 and 
1992) and la Rete (‘the Network’ (1992)). The ‘anti-system’ Right category 
includes the MSI, the Monarchist Party (prior to 1972), the Lega Lombarda 
(Lombard League (1987)) and Lega Nord (the Northern League (1992)). The 
next two rows show the vote share for two possible blocs: the largest 
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possible DC bloc, i.e. the DC together with all parties which could have 
allied with it at the time; and the largest imaginable PCI bloc – a more 
speculative figure, combining the PCI vote with the vote for ‘reformist’ 
parties. (Votes for radical Left parties are not included in this bloc). The last 
three rows contain figures for the difference between the PCI vote and the 
DC vote; the difference between the maximum PCI bloc and the DC vote 
alone; and the difference between the votes for the maximum PCI bloc and 
the maximum DC bloc. 
 
 
Table 1: Vote share at Italian parliamentary elections (Chamber of 
Deputies), 1953-92 
 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 
DC 40.1 42.4 38.3 39.1 38.7 38.7 38.3 32.9 34.3 29.7 
DC allies 9.1 9.5 28.3 22.3 21.5 17.4 18.5 23.5 23.1 23.6 
PCI / PDS 22.6 22.7 25.3 26.9 27.1 34.4 30.4 29.9 26.6 16.1 
Other 
reformist 
12.7 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.4 2.2 5.1 5.9 
Radical Left 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 5.6 
‘Anti-system’ 
Right 
12.7 9.7 6.8 5.7 8.7 6.1 5.3 6.8 6.4  
14.1 
All others 2.8 1.5 1.3 1.6 2.1 0.8 2.7 3.2 2.8 5.0 
Maximum 
bloc: DC 
49.2 51.9 66.6 61.4 60.2 56.1 56.8 56.4 57.4  
53.3 
PCI 35.3 36.9 25.3 26.9 27.1 35.5 33.8 32.1 31.7 22.0 
DC – PCI 17.5 19.7 13.0 12.2 11.6 4.3 7.9 3.0 7.7 13.6 
DC – PCI 
bloc 
4.8 5.5 13.0 12.2 11.6 3.2 4.5 0.8 2.6 7.7 
DC bloc – 
PCI bloc 
13.9 15.0 41.3 34.5 33.1 20.6 23.0 24.3 25.7 31.3 
Sources: Ginsborg, 1990: 442; Ginsborg, 2001: 347 
  
 
Three main periods can be identified. In the 1953 and 1958 elections, the DC 
alone has only a small advantage over the maximum possible PCI bloc, 
despite having an advantage of nearly 20 percent over the PCI itself; the 
reason for this is that the PSI is included in the ‘reformist’ category. 
However, even allowing for the theoretical availability of the PSI as an ally 
for the PCI, the maximum possible DC bloc has an advantage of 13-15 
percent over the maximum PCI bloc. This is a period of DC dominance and 
PCI exclusion; even a theoretically possible – but never realised – alliance 
between the PCI and the PSI would have left the DC and its allies 
comfortably clear of the reunited Left.  
The next three elections, with the PSI established as an ally of the DC, 
show a recovery in the PCI vote, a decline in the vote of the DC’s allies and 
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a rise in the vote of radical Left parties (represented at this point by the 
Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (Italian Socialist Party for 
Proletarian Unity, PSIUP), a splinter from the PSI). The vote for the DC 
itself holds steady throughout this period, but at a lower level than in the 
previous decade. As a result of these trends – all of which can be related to 
the initiation of the ‘centre-left’ in 1963 – the DC’s advantage over the PCI 
falls in this period to the 10 percent region. The isolation of the PCI by the 
centre-left strategy can be gauged from the 40 percent advantage of the 
maximum DC bloc over the maximum PCI bloc in 1963; by 1968 this 
advantage had fallen by 8 percent, but was still substantial. This is a period 
in which the vote shares of the DC and PCI begin to converge, but this is 
more than offset for the DC by the addition of the PSI vote. 
The 1976 election sees a genuine swing to the Left: the PCI vote rises 
above 30 percent for the first time ever, while the votes of DC allies fall 
below 20 percent for the first time since 1963. From then until the 1987 
elections, the vote shares of the maximum possible DC bloc remain steady, 
with a decline in the DC vote offset by a rise in the vote of DC allies, mainly 
accounted for by resurgence in the PSI vote. A parallel decline in the PCI 
vote is only partially offset by a rise in the vote for ‘reformist’ parties; the 
gap between the two ‘blocs’, which had fallen to below 20 percent in 1976, 
steadily widens to 25 percent in 1987, then jumps to 30 percent in 1992 
thanks to the transformation of the PCI into the PDS, and the consequent 
split of the Partito di Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation, 
PRC). 1992 also sees a slump in the votes for the DC, apparently 
attributable to the rise of the Lega Nord. 
From 1976 to 1987, the gap between the DC’s vote alone and that of the 
maximum possible PCI bloc is negligible. However, this convergence only 
exists on paper: the DC was solidly hedged about with allies throughout 
this period, while the PCI – and subsequently the PDS – neither sought nor 
desired alliances with the various leftists, libertarians and ecologists 
making up the ‘reformist’ category. In short, this is a period in which the 
PCI failed to capitalise on its mid-1970s gains, steadily losing vote share to 
the small reformist parties; the party’s vote share in 1987, even before the 
disastrous effects of the split of 1992, is below the level of 1972. Within the 
ruling bloc there is a discernible shift away from the DC and towards the 
Socialists; this period included Bettino Craxi’s two five-party governments. 
Over these three periods we can trace a complex set of developments, 
reflecting the transformation of what was initially a heavily ideological 
Christian Democratic party into a self-perpetuating political machine; it is 
worth noting that the PCI vote rises throughout the first and second 
periods, and that its losses in the third period are partially compensated by 
gains on the part of reformist parties. But these changes all take place 
within definite limits. The DC vote is always higher than the PCI vote; in all 
but two elections the gap between the two is over 5 percent. The DC vote 
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only falls below 30 percent in 1992, on the eve of the earthquake, and before 
that had only twice fallen below 35 percent; in the same period the PCI vote 
had only twice risen above 30 percent and never reached 35 percent. 
Moreover, the vote of the maximum DC bloc (a bloc which was in 
government for most of the 1980s) never drops below 55 percent until 1992; 
in contrast, after 1962 the vote for the entirely notional PCI bloc only once 
exceeds 35 percent.  
If the PCI were ever to form part of a government supported by a 
majority – or even a plurality – of Italian voters, this picture needed to 
change in one of two ways. The first was a straightforward shift in the 
balance of power, thanks to a larger-scale repetition of the general swing to 
the Left seen at the 1976 election; this never seemed likely and only briefly 
seemed possible. The second was a shift in the relative level of cohesion of 
the two blocs: the goal was for the PCI to weld the notional PCI bloc into a 
real political force commanding 35-40 percent of the vote, while at the same 
time the 55 percent of voters consistently supporting the DC and its allies 
were disaggregated into right- and left-leaning groups. Under these 
conditions the PCI’s electoral strength would enable it to make a credible 
appeal to the left wing of the old DC bloc, which in turn would make it 
possible for a PCI-led coalition to gain power. 
Needless to say, this strategy was never put into practice under the 
First Republic. However, it was widely advocated in different forms in the 
PCI in the 1970s, with the Right of the party arguing for an attempt to recall 
the PSI to its radical origins, while the Left proposed instead to split the DC 
itself, releasing its suppressed ‘Christian social’ tendencies. Under the 
leadership of Enrico Berlinguer both perspectives gave way to the Historic 
Compromise strategy, effectively marking the PCI’s acceptance of the DC 
system; after Berlinguer no attempt was made to disaggregate the DC bloc. 
The disintegration of the DC and the emergence of a new Right pole, in the 
form of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, made the task of building a coherent 
PCI-led alliance at once more urgent and more difficult – not least because 
the PCI had now become the PDS and lost the voters represented by PRC. 
Whether overtures to the DC bloc could be made without a move to 
the Right, and whether the gains made from those overtures could offset 
the loss in support on the Left caused by the move Right, had been 
theoretical questions for those debating possible alliance strategies. After 
the First Republic these became real and pressing questions, as Table 2 
shows. 
For simplicity’s sake, a few retrospective assumptions have been 
imposed on the fluidity of the post-1992 period. The first row gives the 
votes for the Right pole of post-1992 politics: Berlusconi’s Popolo della 
Libertà (People of Freedom) and its precursors, Forza Italia and Alleanza 
Nazionale (the National Alliance, AN), together with the Lega Nord, its 
unreliable electoral ally; in 2008 the vote for the Southern autonomists is 
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also included. Avowed successor parties to the DC are not included in this 
category. The third row gives the votes for the PD in 2008 and the Ulivo in 
2006; before 2006, this category includes the vote for the PDS and its 
successor party the DS, together with identifiably ulivista centre parties or 
electoral lists. The second row gives the vote for all other post-DC 
formations, foremost among them the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e 
dei Democratici di Centro (Union of Christian Democrats and Centre 
Democrats, UDC) and its predecessors. The fourth and fifth rows give the 
vote for ‘reformist’ parties (the Radicals, the Greens, la Rete and Di Pietro’s 
Italia dei Valori (Italy of Principles, IdV)) and for radical Left parties, 
mostly former splinters from the PCI. 
 
 
Table 2: Vote share at Italian parliamentary elections (Chamber of 
Deputies), 1994-2008 
 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Right 42.9 46.4 45.4 41.9 46.8 
DC successors 18.0 12.6 5.6 9.2 5.6 
PD and predecessors 20.4 25.4 31.1 31.3 33.2 
Other reformists 8.1 4.4 8.3 7.0 5.4 
Radical Left 6.1 8.6 6.7 8.1 4.2 
All others 4.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 4.8 
Right with DC 60.9 59.0 51.0 51.1 52.4 
Centre Left 28.5 29.8 39.4 38.3 38.6 
Broad Left  34.6 38.4 46.1 46.4 42.8 
Right – PD 22.5 21.0 14.3 10.6 13.6 
Right – Centre Left 14.4 16.6 6.0 3.6 8.2 
Right – Broad Left 8.3 6.0 -0.7 -4.5 4.0 
Right with DC – Broad Left 16.3 20.6 4.9 4.7 7.6 
Sources: Ginsborg, 2001: 347; la Repubblica, 2006b; la Repubblica, 2008 
 
 
 
The ‘bloc’ calculations are also more complex than in the earlier period. I 
have given aggregate figures for three potential ‘blocs’: a Right bloc 
consisting of the core Right vote together with the vote for ‘DC successors’, 
considered as potential allies of the Right; a ‘Centre Left’ bloc including the 
PD and the ‘reformist’ parties, analogous to the ‘maximum PCI’ bloc in 
Table 1, and a ‘Broad Left’ bloc including the PD, the ‘reformist’ parties and 
the radical Left parties. 
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Even in this brief series, two major turning-points can be identified. 
The key event of the period is clearly the consolidation of the Ulivo and 
subsequently the PD, whose effect is clear in the 2001 election. The merger 
takes the vote for the centre-left pole from 20 percent to above 30 percent; 
by the same token, the Right is deprived of a potential ally, reducing the 
maximum potential Right bloc from 59-60 percent to 51-2 percent. In 2006, 
the vote for DC successor parties and for the Left parties shows a 
significant increase against 2001; this is suggestive in part of centrifugal 
political competition within the two coalitions, but also of a genuine 
electoral shift to the Left prompted by the greater credibility of the PD. (For 
both the UDC and the Left parties to gain while the Ulivo vote held steady 
suggests that the Ulivo and the UDC both gained from the Right while 
losing votes to the Left, in a small-scale echo of the shift in DC, PSI and PCI 
votes between 1972 and 1976). The advantage held by a Right bloc 
including DC successor parties over a Broad Left bloc drops to below 5 
percent in 2001 and 2006 (a fall of over 15 percent from the 1996 figure); the 
advantage of the Right bloc alone over the ‘Broad Left’ bloc goes into minus 
figures in 2001, with the Broad Left bloc enjoying a 4.5 percent advantage in 
2006. (Of course, Prodi’s real-world Left alliance did not have this 
advantage, as the Right bloc in this period was bolstered by the UDC). 
These figures suggest a party system rapidly consolidating around a 
bipolar antagonism, opening the way for alternation between successive 
governments based on coalitions commanding between 45 and 55 percent 
of the popular vote. However, there are three inter-related caveats. Firstly, 
the ‘centre’ pole represented by the DC successor parties is massively 
diminished by the consolidation of the PD, but never eliminated. The 
comparison between the party systems resulting from the 2006 and 2008 
elections exhibits a ‘radical “defragmentation” of ... a party system usually 
defined as “fragmented bipolarism”’ (Donovan, 2009: 118), but also 
suggests that the relationship between bipolarity and fragmentation is 
direct, rather than inverse: a decline in fragmentation at the party level was 
accompanied by a decline in bipolarity at the level of the bloc 
(Chiaramonte, 2009: 205). Until 2006, the ex-DC vote remains crucial, with 
neither bloc capable of reaching the 50 percent mark without it. In both 
2001 and 2006, the Right bloc alone falls short of the Broad Left bloc, while 
the ‘Right with DC’ vote has a 4 percent advantage over the Broad Left. On 
the other hand, the vote for the ‘Centre Left’ bloc – the Ulivo/PD plus the 
small reformist parties – is strikingly consistent, registering between 38 and 
40 percent in 2001, 2006 and 2008; this suggests that, without help from 
additional allies to the left or right (or both), the PD has no realistic 
prospect of approaching 50 percent of the vote. Alliance policy is crucial, in 
other words. 
Secondly, the two poles are unevenly matched. Despite the mid-1990s 
dissociation of the Lega Nord from Forza Italia, and despite the far-
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reaching ideological differences between the Lega and the post-Fascists of 
AN, the three parties can reasonably be considered a core Right bloc to 
parallel the Ulivo on the Left: and this core bloc has a consistent 10-15 
percent advantage over the Ulivo/PD. This inevitably makes alternation 
between the two a challenging proposition. 
Thirdly and most fundamentally, the bipolar division of the two main 
blocs is itself imperfect. The point here is not that bipolarity has been 
imposed on a multipolar reality by majoritarian electoral reforms: as I have 
argued, the drive for a transition to some form of political normality has 
become the primary cleavage in Italian politics. However, this dividing 
factor has the predictable, if ironic, effect of uniting those who resist it far 
more effectively than those who support it: one bloc includes those parties 
which oppose all the goals of the transition, coherently and consistently, 
while the other includes those which support any of them, with whatever 
degree of inconsistency and opportunism. Both blocs are ideologically 
heterogeneous, but the relative balance of heterogeneity is strongly in 
favour of the Right. 
This is both a superficial and a fundamental problem for the Left. The 
superficial problem is that of maintaining cohesion among allies who share 
an agenda, but with differing levels of commitment to different elements of 
it. The centripetal pressures produced as a result are likely to promote 
in-fighting and trade-offs over co-ordinated and efficient government, 
leading to counter-intuitive outcomes such as Mastella’s nomination to the 
Justice Ministry. The fundamental problem is that the overriding need to 
promote unity within a heterogeneous coalition – particularly a governing 
coalition with a minute advantage over its rival – effectively calls for the 
suspension of normal politics within the coalition. Under these conditions, 
an irreconcilable disagreement within a coalition risks being seen as 
‘systemically crucial’ (to borrow Pridham’s terminology), in the sense of 
calling the coalition itself into question. 
Prodi’s 2006 government provided an example of this process – and 
demonstrated how damaging it could be – in February 2007. The previous 
month, a parliamentary motion to increase the number of Italian troops in 
Afghanistan and double the size of a US military base met serious 
opposition from the left. In the Senate, two senators abstained: a member of 
PRC and a recently expelled ex-member of the smaller Partito dei 
Comunisti Italiani (Party of Italian Communists, PdCI). Prodi called the 
Left’s bluff and resigned. In the ensuing manoeuvres, the PRC group fell 
into line behind Prodi and expelled its dissident member: Franco 
Turigliatto of Sinistra Critica, which now began to organise as a party in its 
own right. Prodi agreed to form a second government, which obtained the 
confidence of both houses, and in effect picked up where he had left off. 
However, while Prodi had succeeded in calling the Left into line, he 
had no prospect of governing without them. Even an explicit move to the 
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Right, rejecting the ex-Communist parties and offering an alliance to the 
UDC, would not have sustained Prodi in government: the PRC alone had 
more MPs than the UDC, so a centrist Prodi coalition (assuming this was 
feasible) would have immediately lost its majority. Prodi needed the 
support of the PRC and the PdCI, but he needed their support to be offered 
unconditionally; political disagreements, of the type which would normally 
be expected between unrepentant ex-Communists and former Christian 
Democrats, would be fatal to the government. This was a defeat for the ex-
Communist parties, which came out of the episode looking at once 
recklessly extreme and weak-willed in their readiness to abandon the 
policies on which they had been elected. However, for Prodi it was at best a 
Pyrrhic victory: unable to govern without the ex-Communists, his coalition 
was effectively tainted with the extremism which it had ascribed to them. 
The Prodi government’s problems contained an odd echo of the First 
Republic. Within the DC bloc, too, normal politics had been suspended; 
there, too, unity among the broadest possible range of disparate factions 
was the overriding priority, to be arrived at primarily through horse-
trading rather than debate. There, too, the great fear was that dissent would 
lead to fragmentation, which would be exploited by an irreconcilable 
enemy. Consequently, as Capano and Giuliani (2003: 28) noted, consensus 
law-making was the rule:  
 
adversarial dynamics within parliament can only exist when the issue in 
question is ideologically radicalised. However, this strategy can only be 
pursued occasionally by Italian governments: they are coalition 
executives, characterised by a series of internal cleavages. As a result, 
they cannot continually constrain their parliamentary majority to behave 
passively and simply follow the executive’s guidelines. 
 
It is worth noting that PRC leader Bertinotti evoked the possibility of 
bringing politics back in through the use of ‘variable majorities’, 
compensating for left abstention with centre-right support (Paolucci and 
Newell, 2008: 287); this perspective similarly echoes the (limited) fluidity of 
the DC bloc, in which a programme unacceptable to a right-wing ally could 
be passed with centre-left support. In a highly fragmented political system, 
as Newell (2006: 396) notes, this type of fluidity is both normal and 
functional: 
 
If each player wishes to maximise the number of his own projects he 
achieves, he has an incentive to support as many of the other players’ 
projects as he can as the means of maximising his ‘purchasing power’ 
when it comes to his own projects. Therefore, most decisions will be 
taken by large coalitions, the only players left out being those who, for 
ideological and other reasons, have extreme positions on the relevant 
issues and are therefore unable to lend their support because it is too 
costly for them. 
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In this sense we can see Prodi’s all-encompassing coalitions as 
prefigurative, not so much of a Left which could alternate in power with 
the Right, as of the entire legitimate political sphere of a post-transition 
Second Republic: once the system had been purged of Berlusconi’s personal 
influence and the extreme Right had returned to ‘anti-system’ pariah status, 
Italy could be governed by ‘variable majorities’ centred alternately on the 
PD and on some post-transitional party of the constitutional Right. As we 
have seen, however, the PD’s base never had the advantage – relative to the 
existing Right or to its own allies – necessary to make this a reality; 
maintaining coalition unity against the Right had to be the overriding 
priority. Moreover, Berlusconi’s coalition represented a stronger, more 
antagonistic and more skilful adversary to Prodi’s government than the 
PCI had ever presented to the DC; unsurprisingly, Prodi had much less 
success in maintaining coalition unity. 
 
 
Walter Veltroni and the crisis of the Left 
Held, thanks to the defection of Mastella, under a proportional electoral 
system, the 2008 election was nevertheless contested by individual parties 
rather than broad coalitions; this was essentially a result of Veltroni’s 
unilateral decision that the PD would ‘run alone’. In practice, this 
commitment was qualified in favour of a joint ticket with IdV and the 
adoption of Radical-party candidates on the PD list. In other words, 
Veltroni’s PD was prepared to work with precisely those two ‘reformist’ 
parties which lack any Left identity. 
In the 2008 election, both poles gained support (the PD 1.9 percent, the 
Right 4.9 percent – the latter mostly accounted for by a 3.7 percent gain for 
the Lega). The Right clearly gained more than the PD – all the more so 
when changes in bloc composition are taken into account. The centre-left 
bloc had expanded slightly since 2006: the Radical Party ran in 2006 as part 
of the Rosa nel Pugno (‘Rose-in-the-Fist’) alliance, taking 2.6 percent of the 
vote. The centre-right bloc, by contrast, had contracted slightly: the Right 
vote for 2006 includes 1.3 percent obtained by two neo-fascist parties, 
which in 2008 ran as La Destra (‘the Right’) and took 2.4 percent of the vote. 
The Right’s gains in 2008 relative to 2006 can thus be adjusted upward by 
about 1.3 percent and the PD’s downward by a similar amount, giving 
aggregate gains of 6.2 and 0.6 percent respectively. Among post-DC parties, 
only the UDC survived, with its vote reduced from 6.8 to 5.6 percent. The 
‘reformist’ vote fell overall, but this masks a striking advance by IdV, from 
2.3 to 4.4 percent of the vote. Neither the Radicals nor the Greens make a 
showing in this category: the Radical vote was absorbed into the PD vote, 
while the Greens ran as part of the Sinistra Arcobaleno (‘Rainbow Left’, 
SA): a new list, bringing together the PRC, the PdCI, the Greens and 
Sinistra Democratica (the Democratic Left), a Left splinter from the DS. The 
 
 
Alternation? What alternation? 
 
 
 
335 
parties of the SA suffered the greatest defeat of the election. The PRC, the 
PdCI and the Greens had taken 10.3 percent of the vote in 2006; in 2008, the 
three parties together with Sinistra Democratica took only 3.1 percent and 
failed to win any seats. (Another 1.1 percent of the vote was shared 
between Sinistra Critica and the Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori (the 
Workers’ Communist Party), an earlier PRC splinter). Post-election polling 
showed, out of those former PRC and PdCI voters who voted in 2008, only 
about 40 percent of PRC voters and 20 percent of PdCI voters had remained 
faithful to their party, with 40 percent of PRC voters and 50 percent of PdCI 
voters voting PD; the remainder divided between their original party, 
micro-parties of ex-Communist duri e puri and the different anti-political 
appeals of IdV and the Lega (Buzzanca, 2008). 
In terms of the overall configuration of the party system, the pseudo-
majoritarian election of 2008 had three distinct effects; one was clearly 
willed by Veltroni, while the other two were at least eminently predictable. 
The first was an increase in political concentration: between them, the PD 
and the Right bloc (the newly-formed Popolo della Libertà plus the Lega 
and the southern Autonomists) took 80 percent of the vote, as compared 
with the 76.2 percent taken by the predecessors in 2006. However, as we 
have seen, the process of polarisation was considerably more effective for 
one pole than the other. Thus, the second effect was a swing to the Right. 
Between 2001 and 2006, as we saw above, the Ulivo vote held steady while 
the Right vote declined and the Left vote rose, suggesting that both the 
Ulivo and the UDC gained from their right and lost to their left. The 
reverse process is visible in 2008, with the Ulivo/PD vote rising only very 
slightly while the Right vote rises by 6 percent and the far Left vote loses a 
similar amount. The inference has to be that the PD lost votes to its right – 
to IdV and the UDC – at very much the same rate as it gained voti utili from 
the far Left: an alarming precedent for any future election at which the far 
Left was less effectively excluded. 
The third effect relates to proportionality. Majoritarian electoral 
systems are something of a cult object among Italian enthusiasts for 
bipolarism: the loss in proportionality entailed by a majoritarian system is 
believed to be amply compensated by the unambiguous bipolarism which 
it delivers, which in turn is believed to be associated with greater 
government legitimacy and effectiveness. However, as Tables 3 and 4 
show, the effect on proportionality of a majoritarian electoral system is 
quite different from the effect of an artificial squeeze on minority parties 
within a semi-proportional system, as seen in the 2008 election. Tables 3 
and 4 both show the percentage of votes cast for parties, the percentage of 
seats obtained by them and the seat/vote ratio at two successive elections; 
Table 3 relates to the British general elections of 2001, 2005 and 2010, Table 
4 to the Italian elections of 2006 and 2008. 
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Table 3: Vote share, seat allocation and seat/vote ratio at British 
parliamentary elections, 2001, 2005 and 2010 
 2001 2005 2010 
 Vote % 
Seat 
% 
S/V 
(%) 
Vote 
% 
Seat 
% 
S/V 
(%) Vote % Seat % 
S/V 
(%) 
Labour 40.7 62.5 153.6 35.2 55.0 156.2 29 39.7 136.9 
Conservative 31.7 25.2 79.6 32.4 30.7 94.7 36.1 47.1 130.6 
Labour + 
Conservative 72.4 87.7 121.1 67.6 85.6 126.6 
65.0 86.8 133.4 
Liberal 
Democrats 18.3 7.9 43.3 22.1 9.6 43.4 
23.0 8.8 38.1 
Others with 
seats 5.7 4.3 74.6 5.4 4.8 88.9 
5.0 4.5 89.5 
Others 
without seats 3.7 n/a n/a 5.0 n/a n/a 
6.9.0 n/a n/a 
 Source: Kimber, 2011 
 
 
Table 4: Vote share, seat allocation and seat/vote ratio at Italian 
parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies), 2006 and 2008 
 2006 2008 
 Vote % Seat % S/V (%) Vote % Seat % S/V (%) 
Right 41.9 37.8 90.2 46.8 54.6 116.7 
DC successors 9.2 8.4 91.3 5.6 5.7 101.8 
PD and predecessors 31.3 36.0 115.0 33.2 34.4 103.6 
Other reformists 7.0 7.8 111.4 4.4 4.6 104.5 
Left 8.1 9.0 111.1 n/a n/a n/a 
Others with seats 0.6 1.0 166.7 0.5 0.7 140.0 
Others without seats 1.9 n/a n/a 9.5 n/a 
 
n/a 
Sources: la Repubblica, 2006b; la Repubblica, 2008 
 
 
In the British majoritarian system, as we can see, between 4 and 7 percent 
of the vote is consistently wasted – in the sense of going to parties with no 
elected representative – while another 5-6 percent goes to regional and 
independent parties taking 4-5 percent of the seats. Plurality contests in 
individual constituencies result in consistent over-representation of the two 
main parties, Labour and Conservative; taken together, the two parties’ 
seats overstate their total vote by between 20 and 30 percent in all three 
elections. In 2001 and 2005 the winning party (Labour) was substantially 
over-represented in Parliament, with the Conservative Party under-
represented; in 2010 both parties were over-represented by a similar 
margin. The third party, the Liberal Democrats, suffers badly in all three 
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elections: the ‘third-party squeeze’ consistently reduces their share of 
representation to less than 50 percent of their vote share. 
The Italian election of 2006 was the first conducted under a system 
combining broad proportionality with party and coalition thresholds and a 
‘majority premium’. In the 2006 results, the premio di maggioranza is 
reflected in symmetrical over- and under-representation: the PD, their 
reformist allies and the Left parties all have a seat/vote ratio of 110 percent 
or more, while the ratio for the Right and the DC successor parties is 
around 90 percent. Less than 2 percent of the vote went to parties without 
any elected representatives, a fairly typical figure for Italian national 
elections. In 2008, by contrast, the victors are rewarded with a 116 percent 
seat/vote ratio, but the losers are also rewarded. The PD and IdV together 
take 39 percent of the seats on 37.6 percent of the vote; even the third party, 
the UDC, has a seat/vote ratio greater than 100 percent. The reason why 
the electoral spoils can be distributed so generously is, of course, that 
nearly one in ten votes were cast for parties which fell short of the 4 percent 
threshold and were consequently denied any representation in Parliament. 
The 9.5 percent of voters whose votes were discarded include 5.2 percent 
who voted for parties to the Left of the PD (3.1 percent for the SA, 1 percent 
for the Socialist Party and 1.1 percent for the two ex-Communist parties). 
What Veltroni brought about was not a third-party squeeze but a fourth-
party wipe-out, with a correspondingly broader, although smaller-scale, 
division of spoils. 
Perhaps the best that Veltroni could have obtained by repeating 
Prodi’s alliance strategy would have been an equally fractious coalition 
with an equally fragile majority. But what is surely certain is that the PD-
alone strategy gave absolutely no prospect of winning the election. 
Reviewing Tables 1 and 2, taking the voting history of the period since 1992 
together with that of the First Republic, it is clear that a party occupying the 
ideological position of the PCI has never had any prospect of gaining 51 
percent of the vote in Italy. For alternation to become a reality, a new and 
more presentable Left party was not the only or even the primary 
requirement. Once the old DC bloc had been split into left, right and centre 
components, it was imperative for as much of that bloc as possible to be 
drawn into a centre-left alliance. Moreover, this alliance had to be built in 
such a way as to retain – or if possible regain – the votes of the far Left; 
otherwise the danger was that all the ex-PCI would achieve would be to 
move to the Right, losing votes to its left as fast as it gained them from the 
right (PCI, 1976: 34.4 percent; PD, 2008: 33.2 percent). In short, the party 
needed to combine openness to left Christian Democrats with sufficiently 
strong socialist commitments to keep the radical Left on side, together with 
a strong enough commitment to the ethical goals of the ‘transition’ 
perspective to justify an alliance with the small reformist parties. 
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This almost impossible three-way balancing act was what Romano 
Prodi had achieved, with the alliance that narrowly won the 2006 election. 
By setting his face against this approach, Veltroni gifted the 2008 election to 
Berlusconi. 
 
 
Conclusion: six decades and counting? 
Seventeen years into the period of ‘transition’ – and 61 years after the 
challenge of democratic consolidation first arose – the balance sheet is not 
hopeful. The primacy of politics is a dead letter: successive Berlusconi 
governments have promoted ad personam legislation designed to shield the 
Prime Minister’s business interests; meanwhile, systems of corrupt 
exchange seem as well-established as ever, with the difference that 
revelations of corruption are no longer perceived as systemically 
threatening (della Porta and Vannucci, 2007; Allum and Allum, 2008). 
There is no sign of alternation becoming established. Pasquino could fairly 
describe the beginning of Berlusconi’s second government in 2001 as the 
Italian political system’s ‘first peaceful alternation ever since 1876’ 
(Pasquino, 2004), but one swallow does not make a summer. Five years 
later, Berlusconi greeted the victory of Prodi’s Unione coalition by 
disputing the result, pointedly refusing to congratulate Prodi, and finally 
maintaining that ‘they will just be an interlude, we will be in a position to 
render them harmless’ (la Repubblica, 2006a). The exclusion of the Left in 
any shape or form seems to come as naturally to Berlusconi’s governments 
as to their DC-led predecessors, despite occasional gestures to cross-party 
collaboration. Berlusconi advised his followers after the close of the 
Prodian interlude in 2008: ‘This Left isn’t fit to govern or to form the 
opposition ... Some of you have said that bipolarism leads to alternation in 
government. Alternation - what alternation? We’re going to be in 
government for a long time’ (Corriere della Sera, 2008). 
Meanwhile, the perception that governmental failures reflect on the 
system itself remains endemic. Prodi’s 2006-8 government was dogged by 
crises which were perceived as calling into question the possibility and 
legitimacy of a government of the left. The continued pressure for electoral 
reform also attests to the widespread perception, on both sides of the 
political divide, that systemic as well as policy reforms are needed: in the 
speech with which Veltroni put himself forward as candidate to lead the 
PD, as much attention is devoted to electoral and parliamentary reform as 
to tax reform (Veltroni, 2007). So far from generally supporting democratic 
values, Italian political culture is now characterised by two diametrically 
opposed readings of what constitutes support of the system, which are 
united only in deploring each other’s influence. On the Left, Berlusconi 
stands accused of undermining the democratic system by reducing political 
culture to the level of a game show or a soap opera, a TV ‘format’ (Berselli, 
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2008); on the Right, conversely, it is argued that Berlusconi’s governments 
have been undermined by the persistence of a ‘cultural hegemony of the 
Left’ (Tarchi 2003: 156; the phrase is quoted from the 2002 programme of 
AN).  
The Left, and the PD in particular, has no alternative but to address the 
‘transition’ agenda anew, from a starting position which has never been 
less favourable. The party at least now shows some awareness of the task 
facing it. In February 2009, running against Veltroni’s deputy Dario 
Franceschini for the post of caretaker secretary of the PD, Prodi ally Arturo 
Parisi called for the party to turn away from ‘those who led us into this 
swamp’ (Corriere della Sera, 2009); he lost to Franceschini by 92 votes to 
1047. Eight months later, Franceschini was defeated when party members 
and supporters elected Pierluigi Bersani to the secretary’s post, with a 
plurality of votes in every region of the country (Partito Democratico, 
2009). Bersani’s motion, at the party congress which preceded the 
primaries, charges that ‘the vocation for the majority has turned into 
nothing more than the short-cut of a political cult of the new [nuovismo 
politico]’, and that ‘media-based image-making has often been given 
priority over the definition of a recognisable political identity’ (Bersani, 
2009): a strongly-worded critique of Veltroni’s strategy, together with a 
commitment to a longer and more painstaking project of building for 
government. 
Veltroni’s disastrous term as leader of the PD can now be seen as an 
attempt to find an exit from the political predicament to which the 
‘transition’ perspective offers itself as a remedy. The anti-system Left 
would be sacrificed; the primacy of politics would be asserted through 
principled co-operation with the Berlusconi government when it was 
possible, and equally principled opposition when it was not; and 
alternation would be achieved, once the PD had shown the government 
and the country that it was worthy of it. This short-cut strategy, and the at 
times desperate nuovismo that went with it, have now been tested to 
destruction; Bersani’s resounding victory suggests that the construction of 
a more coherent and viable oppositional project is beginning. Nineteen 
years on from the fall of the First Republic, the Italian political system is 
still dominated by the transition agenda and the democratic distortions 
which created it. The Italian Left may choose not to engage with the 
problematic of transition, but cannot choose to escape it. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The idea of political interventions by ‘non-political’ actors is problematic. 
Pridham (1990: 108) also refers in this passage to ‘political actors associated with 
the previous authoritarian regime’: ‘ex-authoritarian political actors’ such as the 
armed forces, of which it is required ‘that they should precisely cease to be political 
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actors under the new democracy’. ‘Non-political’ actors, in other words, are actors 
who held power under an authoritarian regime and whose power base lies outside 
democratic politics. 
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